Comparable worth is designed to raise the earnings of women assumed to be penalized for working in femaledominated occupations. Comparable worth advocates assume that the relation between earnings and percentage female in an occupation is due to crowding or other forms of discrimination. An alternative explanation is that the relation stems from women freely choosing different occupations. In other words, preferences are an omitted variable. In our study, we first replicate previous research that has used crosssectional data to find a negative relation between earnings and percentage female (in an occupation) for both men and women. However, using longitudinal data to control for time-invariant omitted variables, we find that while men's estimated penalty is not reduced, the percentage female penalty falls substantially for women and is not statistically significant. These results imply that estimates of the percentage female effect based on crosssectional data may be inflated for women. An exception to this general finding is that women with intermittent labor force participation do experience a sizeable penalty for working in female-dominated occupations. Hence, this pattern of results suggests that a comparable worth policy would most likely benefit women with discontinuous employment--perhaps an unintended outcome.
ABSTRACT
Comparable worth is designed to raise the earnings of women assumed to be penalized for working in female-dominated occupations.
Comparable worth advocates assume that the relation between earnings and percentage female in an occupation is due to crowding or other forms of discrimination. An alternative explanation is that the relation stems from women freely choosing different occupations.
In other words, preferences are an omitted variable.
In our study, we first replicate previous research that has used cross-sectional data to find a negative relation between earnings and percentage female (in an occupation) for both men and women. However, using longitudinal data to control for time-invariant omitted variables, we find that while men's estimated penalty is not reduced, the percentage female penalty falls substantially for women and is not statistically significant.
These results imply that estimates of the percentage female effect based on cross-sectional data may be inflated for women. An exception to this general finding is that women with intermittent labor force participation do experience a sizeable penalty for working in femaledominated occupations. Hence, this pattern of results suggests that a comparable worth policy would most likely benefit women with discontinuous employment--perhaps an unintended outcome.
An important source of the lower earnings of women relative to men is their differential placement in firms, occupations, and jobs (Sieling, 1984; Bielby & Baron, 1986) .
One explanation is that women choose different occupations than men because of different preferences.
Because of weaker labor force attachment, for example, women may choose occupations where their skills will depreciate less slowly during spells of absence from the labor market (Polachek, 1981) .1
An alternative explanation is that discrimination results in the differential placement.
For example, women may have historically had access to only a limited number of occupations. This "crowding" would have resulted in an oversupply of labor to these occupations, driving down wages (Bergmann, 1974) . Further, it has been suggested that persons employed in female-dominated occupations receive lower returns to occupational characteristics (e.g. specific vocational preparation)
because "women's work" is undervalued. Consistent with these hypotheses, evidence suggests that the percentage female of an occupation's employment is negatively associated with earnings (Fuchs, 1971; Rytina, 1981; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981; Johnson & Solon, 1986; EI Cheikh, 1988; Sorensen, 1987) .
Further, Buchele and Aldrich (1985) found that unequal returns to two occupational characteristics, general educational development and specific vocational preparation, explained the majority of women's earnings disadvantage.
If discrimination is the culprit, comparable worth is a public policy option that seeks to raise women's relative earnings. and Buchele describe a lower-bound measure which is equivalent to the portion of the earnings gap due to differences in levels and 7 coefficients (i.e. the total amount attributable). Table 1 reports means and standard deviations.
RESULTS
The first set of results in Table 2 are estimates using the 1986 cross-section. The coefficients on percentage female indicate that movement from a 100% female occupation to a 100% male occupation is associated with an earnings decline of 13.2% for men, 9.9% for women.
Although the magnitude of these effects are somewhat smaller than in previous work using individual level Current Population Surveys data (e.g. Johnson & Solon, 1986; Sorensen, 1987) , the pattern is similar in that men's penalty is higher.
The other two sets of results reported in Table 2 The final set of results in (1982) for an alternative view.
2.Taking yet another approach, Buchelle and Aldrich (1985) , instead of examining the role of percentage female, measured the impact of comparable worth as the reduction in the earnings gap resulting from the elimination of unequal returns to occupational characteristics realized by men and women.
However, most authors (including Aldrich & Buchelle in their later work) focus on percentage female--we do the same.
3.See Ehrenberg
(1987) for a critique and discussion of attempts to measure the impact of a comparable worth policy.
4.Initial work on these issues used the Current Population
Surveys (El Cheikh, 1988) .
However, these data had important drawbacks. Chief among them was that longitudinal data were limited to two consecutive years on any person.
One year proved to be an inadequate period of time for any significant mobility to occur. As such, estimates for a fixed effects model of the type discussed below were very imprecise as indicated by equation R2s that did not reach statistical significance. In response to these problems, we decided to use data from the Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys.
5.This restriction was necessary for estimation of the within groups or fixed effects model.
6.An alternative explanation is that the pooling (and double-counting of some persons) causes the different results.
To test this possibility, we pooled persons who worked in either 1983 or 1986. We obtained percentage female coefficients of -.160 (SE = .020) and -.100
(SE = .020), for men and women, respectively.
These, of course are quite close to those obtained using the 1986 cross-section, suggesting that it is not the pooling of different years that changes the results. 7.Note also that for both men and women, the magnitude of the R2 in the within groups model is comparable to that in the between groups model, suggesting that the strategy of spacing the two time periods three years apart and using a young sample was successful in reducing the errors in variables problem.
8.Sorensen did not report her complete decomposition results. calculated the results based on her Tables 2 and 3. We 9.Where independent variables do not have a natural metric, scaling decisions are made. The latter influence the portion of the difference attributed to differences in constants and returns to other independent variables (Jones, 1983).
Consequently, interpretation of differences in returns to particular independent variables is risky.
10.An alternative explanation for obtaining smaller coefficients using a within groups model is that errors in variables problems were exacerbated.
In our study, however, the latter explanation may be difficult to sustain because the percentage female coefficient for men was actually larger using the within groups model. Moreover, the equation R2s were comparable in the between and within groups models for both men and women.
Thus, we conclude that the use of a sample where actual changes in variables were large relative to errors of measurement effectively controlled potentially severe errors in variables difficulties.
11.Note also that within-firm studies (Rosenbaum, 1985; Hartmann, 1987; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1987) have provided little support for the notion that the female dominance of an occupation or job contributes to lower pay.
Because comparable worth is a within-firm policy, these results again raise questions about its effect on earnings differentials. 
